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Theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Perceptual Symbol SystemsTheory; Barsalou, 1999,
2009) suggest that modality specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts.
Supporting evidence comes from modality switch costs: participants are slower to verify
a property in one modality (e.g., auditory, BLENDER-loud) after verifying a property in a
different modality (e.g., gustatory, CRANBERRIES-tart) compared to the same modality
(e.g., LEAVES-rustling, Pecher et al., 2003). Similarly, modality switching costs lead to a
modulation of the N400 effect in event-related potentials (ERPs; Collins et al., 2011; Hald
et al., 2011). This effect of modality switching has also been shown to interact with the
veracity of the sentence (Hald et al., 2011).The current ERP study further explores the role
of modality match/mismatch on the processing of veracity as well as negation (sentences
containing “not”). Our results indicate a modulation in the ERP based on modality and
veracity, plus an interaction. The evidence supports the idea that modality specific simula-
tions occur during language processing, and furthermore suggest that these simulations
alter the processing of negation.
Keywords: ERP, N400, negation, embodiment, language processing, veracity, modality, modality switch effect
INTRODUCTION
When reading, it has been demonstrated that switching from a
sentence primarily describing information in one modality to text
describing information in another modality leads to an increase
in processing cost (the modality switch effect, Pecher et al., 2003).
Similar modality switching effects have been found across both
conceptual and perceptual processing tasks (e.g., Spence et al.,
2001; Marques, 2006; Vermeulen et al., 2007; Van Dantzig et al.,
2008). For instance, Pecher et al. (2003) presented participants
with short sentences one after another that consisted of a concept
followed by a modal property (they used audition, vision, taste,
smell, touch, and action). Unknown to the participants, the sen-
tences were actually in pairs that either matched or mismatched
in modality. For example, a matched auditory modality would
be Leaves can be rustling followed by A blender can be loud vs.
mismatched gustatory-auditory modalities Cranberries can be tart
followed by A blender can be loud. Although participants were
unaware that the sentences were paired, reaction times to verify
whether the final word was a typical property of the concept (e.g.,
that loud was a typical property of the concept blender, property
verification task) were faster and more accurate when the pairs
of sentences matched in modality compared to pairs that mis-
matched. Recent evidence indicates that the modality switch effect
also results in a modulation of event-related potentials (ERPs),
specifically a modulation of the N400 effect (e.g., Collins et al.,
2011; Hald et al., 2011; described in more detail below). An N400
is a negative deflection in the ERP that begins around 250 ms
post stimulus onset and peaks around 400 ms. It is typically larger
across the centro-parietal electrode sites. Broadly speaking, an
N400 effect has been shown to occur to any meaningful stimuli,
such as a word, picture, or sign in sign language, that is either less
expected or anomalous based on the particular context or knowl-
edge a person has about the situation (see Kutas and Federmeier,
2011, for a recent review). Typically, the modality switch effect has
been explained by the idea that our conceptual system is grounded
in modality specific or embodied simulations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999;
Glenberg and Robertson, 1999, 2000; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan and
Madden, 2005; but, see also Louwerse and Connell, 2011, for a
discussion of the influence of statistical regularities on this effect).
That is, the meanings of linguistic stimuli rely on modality specific
sensorimotor information or simulations. Within this framework
it has been proposed that the switching cost is due to changing
from one modality specific brain system to another.
The goal of the current study is to explore the modulation of
the modality switch N400 effect. Specifically, we aim to explore
whether this effect is sensitive to linguistic and semantic mark-
ers. By adding specific linguistic and semantic properties to the
typical modality switch paradigm, we hope to better understand
the timing and the automaticity of embodied cognition effects
during language processing. An understanding of the timing and
automaticity of embodied effects on language comprehension is
necessary for building a better model of the role of embodied cog-
nition in language processing. To realize this goal, we have added
the factors negation and veracity to a typical modality switch par-
adigm. Additionally, we have implemented a different task for the
participants.
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Typically, studies looking at the modality switch effect have
utilized the property verification task. As discussed above, partic-
ipants have to verify that a property is “usually true” or “usually
false” of a particular concept (e.g., Pecher et al., 2003). In order
to explore the role of veracity and negation within this paradigm,
we decided to implement the sentence verification task. Sentence
verification is similar to property verification. In sentence verifica-
tion, sentences are presented and subjects respond with a true or
false judgment at the end of the sentence. Comparing items that
work in both tasks it is clear that some items can be almost iden-
tical (“A blender can be loud”), while others can only be used in
the sentence verification (“A baby drinks milk”). The advantage of
using sentence verification rather than property verification is that
the former has a long history of being used to investigate veracity
and negation both behaviorally (for a review of the sentence verifi-
cation task, see Carpenter and Just, 1975) and in ERP experiments
(e.g., Fischler et al., 1983).
WHY VERACITY AND NEGATION?
Veracity and negation have been studied outside of the domain of
embodied cognition extensively. For veracity, it has been consis-
tently shown that when participants are asked to judge the veracity
of a sentence, true sentences are verified faster than false sentences
(for example, Trabasso et al., 1971; Clark and Chase, 1972; Wason,
1980). The primary explanation for this is that readers match
the relevant conceptual information provided in the sentence to
either the external situation (when the task requires comparing
the veracity of a sentence to a given picture) or their general world
knowledge (when the task involves sentences only). When the con-
ceptual information and external situation/world knowledge are
incongruent (a false sentence) there is a slowing of responses (Car-
penter and Just, 1975; see also Fischler et al., 1983). Similarly, a
corresponding modulation of the N400 effect using ERPs has been
seen for false sentences (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983; Hagoort et al.,
2004). However, whether this comparison between information in
the sentence and general world knowledge relies on an embodied
representation of the sentence in order to judge veracity is not
clear. Furthermore, to our knowledge no model of embodied cog-
nition has adequately described how this comparison process may
happen. This is a point we return to.
Across many experiments it has been found that sentences con-
taining negation are verified or read slower than sentences that do
not contain negation (Wason, 1959, 1980; Trabasso et al., 1971;
Clark and Chase, 1972; Carpenter and Just, 1975; Singer, 2006).
Furthermore, an interaction of negation and veracity has been
replicated many times. Essentially, true affirmative sentences (Six
is an even number) are verified or read faster than false affirmative
sentences (Six is an odd number), while true negative sentences
(Six is not an odd number) are verified or read slower than false
negative sentences (Six is not an even number). “Two-step” theo-
ries of negation suggest that the reason that determining the truth
value of a negated sentence is particularly difficult is because peo-
ple have to first suppose an “inner proposition” (Six is an odd
number) before they can apply the negation term to compute the
truth value (e.g., Kintsch, 1974; Carpenter and Just, 1975; Clark
and Clark, 1977; see Kaup et al., 2007a for review). A related
finding has also been shown using ERPs. Specifically, negative
sentences lead to a different pattern in the N400 compared to
affirmative sentences (Fischler et al., 1983). Although the typical
finding with affirmative sentences is a larger N400 for false, seman-
tically incorrect sentences, for sentences containing negation it is
the correct, semantically coherent sentences that lead to a larger
N400 amplitude. It is often assumed that this N400 reflects the
“inner proposition,” prior to the point negation is actually inte-
grated (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983). In sum, the results with both
ERPs and reading times suggest that true negated sentences are
more difficult to process than false negated sentences.
The only exception to the processing difficulties and ERP pat-
tern for negation appears to be when a context is used that supports
the use of negation (e.g., Wason, 1965; Wales and Grieve, 1969;
Glenberg et al., 1999; Garton and Robertson, 2003; Nieuwland
and Kuperberg, 2008; Tian et al., 2010). When there is an appro-
priate context, the processing of negation appears to be processed
in a manner similar to affirmative sentences. That is, the pattern of
reaction times and ERPs look no different from what you would
expect with an affirmative sentence.
Interestingly, both false sentences and negated sentences have
presented complications in terms of how they are represented in an
embodied framework. Barsalou (1999) describes negation as being
closely related to the concept of truth. Although both negation
and falsity are discussed in the context of comparing a sentence
to a situation (or picture) as opposed to background knowledge
about the topic, essentially Barsalou proposes that both are repre-
sented by creating absent mappings within a simulation between
the relevant entities. Specifically, when making a simulation of the
information in a sentence, either a false sentence or a negated sen-
tence can lead to a simulation that fails. The marking of that failure,
noting the absence of a binding between the relevant entities is
what underlies the representation. For example, when simulating
the sentences “It’s false that there is a balloon above the cloud” and
“It’s true that there is not a balloon above the cloud” noting the
absence of a binding between balloon and cloud is necessary in
the simulation of both sentences. Based on this explanation, one
might expect to find a similar ERP modulation relative to modality
switching for both false sentences and sentences containing nega-
tion since according to this embodied cognition framework, they
are simulated/represented in the same manner. However, the pos-
sible mechanisms of embodied veracity and negation processing
have not been well explored. It is still an open question whether,
and especially how, an embodied representation could support
veracity judgment and negation processing.
Finding that modality switching interacts with veracity and/or
negation would help us better understand how sentence pro-
cessing relies on embodied cognition. Furthermore, it is possible
that we see differential ERP modulation for modality switching
in sentences containing negation compared to false sentences.
Finding such an effect would indicate that the Barsalou (1999)
account of negation and false sentences is insufficient. For these
reasons, we have implemented the sentence verification task to
explore modality switching in true and false sentences that contain
negation.
Following a brief review of the small amount of research that
exists on the embodied nature of veracity and negation, details of
the current experiment will be discussed.
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VERACITY AND MODALITY SWITCHING WITH AFFIRMATIVE
SENTENCES
The study most relevant to the current study is a recent one by
Hald et al. (2011). The authors explored veracity and the modality
switch effect with affirmative sentences. In this study, the experi-
mental materials included both true and false modality matched
and mismatched pairs (see Table 1).
For example, the ERPs were compared for soft (vs. soft ) and
hard (vs. hard) depending on the modality match/mismatch.
Additionally, the ERPs to true vs. false sentences (soft vs. hard)
were compared within match and within mismatch conditions.
As discussed above, in traditional ERP studies a consistently
larger amplitude N400 is typically seen for words that complete a
sentence in such a way as to make the truth value of the sentence
false (for example, at the final word when comparing a ham is blue
vs. a ham is pink; Fischler et al., 1983). However, it is unclear how
or whether a match or mismatch in modality may affect the pro-
cessing related to veracity in such cases. It has been suggested that
when a false sentence is read, simulation fails. That is, the meaning
of the sentence cannot be successfully mapped onto reality (Barsa-
lou,1999). Presumably at this point a new simulation is performed,
somehow grounded in the failed simulation (see Barsalou, 1999
for more details on this argument). However, whether and how
this actually occurs is unclear. One of the purposes of looking at
false sentences in the modality switch paradigm was to shed light
on the process of understanding a false sentence, and to explore
how this may occur according to embodied models of cognition.
The results of Hald et al. (2011) indicated a different pattern
of results for true and false sentences. Specifically, for the true
sentences, switching modalities elicited a greater negativity across
anterior electrodes as early as 160 ms after the onset of the critical
word (soft ). This effect was seen in three time windows: from 160
to 215 ms, from 270 to 370 ms, and again from 500 to 700 ms (see
also Collins et al., 2011 for similar ERP results using the property
verification task). However, for the false sentences, no significant
effect of modality switching was seen. When comparing the effect
of veracity (soft vs. hard) within the mismatch condition (A leop-
ard is spotted – A peach is soft/hard), a typical N400 was seen for
false sentences compared to true sentences. However, when the
modality matched (An iron is hot – A peach is soft/hard), no effect
of veracity was found. In so far as the N400 amplitude reflects
difficulty in processing, this result suggests that the construction
of a simulation in one modality aided the matching modality
simulation of the target sentence. Possibly this led to the false
sentences being no more difficult to comprehend than the true
sentences.
Table 1 | Example tactile materials from Hald et al. (2011).
Veracity Modality switch Modality context Target sentence
True Mismatched A leopard is spotted A peach is soft
Matched An iron is hot A peach is soft
False Mismatched A leopard is spotted A peach is hard
Matched An iron is hot A peach is hard
Critical words are shown here in bold for clarification.
This study suggests that veracity judgments are grounded in
an embodied manner. That is, when a saving can be made in the
embodied simulation of the sentence by having the same modality
simulated twice in a row, this leads to improved ability to judge
the veracity of false sentences. Although this result indicates that
embodied cognition is important for the processing of semantics
related to judging truth value, it does not address whether embod-
ied cognition plays a role in more linguistically marked aspects of
language, namely negation.
NEGATION, EMBODIED COGNITION, AND CONTEXT
Evidence supporting the idea that at least at a late point in time,
negation processing relies on embodied simulations comes from
Kaup et al. (2007b) to Kaup and Zwaan (2003). In both studies,
they assessed the accessibility of a word that was either negated
or not using a recognition task. For example, in Kaup and Zwaan
(2003) participants were presented with short discourses that con-
tained a color term that was either mentioned within the scope of
a negative context or not, which then led to a situation where
the color was either present or not. Participants had to determine
whether a color term was in the previous sentence (probe recog-
nition task). For example, for the sentence Sam was relieved that
Laura was not wearing her pink dress, the probe word pink was
presented after the sentence at an early and late time delay. In this
example, the color term pink was within the scope of negation
and the color pink would not actually be present in the situation
described. Results indicated that at the early delay probe point
(500 ms delay after sentence end) response times were slower when
the color term had been negated. In the late time delay (1500 ms)
the response time to the color term was influenced by the con-
tent of the situation (whether the situation described meant the
color would be part of the situation, for example Sam wished that
Laura was not wearing her pink dress, where the pink dress is part
of the situation vs. Sam was relieved that Laura was not wearing
her pink dress, where the pink dress is not part of the situation).
This experiment, as well as others (e.g., Kaup et al., 2006) support
the general idea that a simulation is made that notes the absence
of negated information, making that information more difficult
to retrieve. However, these studies only speak to the eventual rep-
resentation of the negation, rather than to the ongoing process of
comprehending/representing the negation as the sentence unfolds.
Furthermore, these studies support the idea that something like a
simulation is built, but do not address the specifics of how/whether
the simulation is grounded in perceptual, action, and emotional
information (although, see Kaup et al., 2006, for results suggest-
ing that spatial information is part of this embodied simulation, at
least at a delayed point). The current study will specifically address
the role of perceptual modalities in the online processing of nega-
tion. However, as discussed earlier, when it comes to negation,
context matters.
Whether an early effect of negation processing appears is largely
related to the context in which negation is used, that is when the
context supports the use of negation (see Glenberg et al., 1999).
The goal of the current study was to better understand what the
role of a modality match/mismatch may be on the ongoing pro-
cessing of negation. The current study was designed to answer
the following questions: first, can we find a modality switch effect
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with sentences containing negation? If we do see such an effect,
this suggests that sentences containing negation are grounded in
perceptual systems1. Secondly, since context has been shown to
affect the processing of negation, can modality information sim-
ilarly change the processing of negation? Given that Hald et al.,
2011 found that modality matching aided the processing of false
sentences, could modality matching similarly facilitate negation
processing?
THE CURRENT STUDY
The current study is based on the Hald et al. (2011) study in
Section “Veracity and Modality Switching with Affirmative Sen-
tences.”However, in addition to exploring the effect of veracity and
modality switching, here the target sentences all included negation
(see Table 2 in Materials and Methods for example stimuli).
For the modality switch effect in negated sentences, we com-
pared the ERPs time locked to the identical word in a sentence,
depending on whether the previous context sentence matched or
mismatched in modality. For example, we compared the ERP to
the word soft in the true sentence The marble isn’t soft when it
was preceded by a modality matched sentence (A summer night is
balmy) vs. when it was preceded by a modality-mismatched sen-
tence (A kingfisher is bright blue; see Materials and Methods for
details about the sentence materials). Finally, to explore the effect
of modality and negation on veracity we compared the ERPs to
true vs. false sentences within the match condition and then within
the mismatch condition (for example comparing The marble isn’t
soft vs. The marble isn’t hard when the previous sentence matched
in modality.
According to embodied accounts of cognition/language pro-
cessing (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2009; Zwaan and Madden, 2005),
as well as the previous results discussed above, we expect to see
an effect of modality switching in the true sentences. However,
1We assume that this would also be the case for motor and emotional systems (i.e., a
mismatch effect would occur for negated sentences containing action or emotional
information). However, as the current study only looks at perceptual modalities, we
can only conclude that sentences containing negation are grounded in perceptual
systems.
Table 2 | Example materials for tactile and visual modality.
Veracity Modality
switch
Modality
context
Target
sentence
Tactile target sentence example
True Mismatched A kingfisher is bright blue A marble isn’t soft
Matched A summer night is balmy A marble isn’t soft
False Mismatched A kingfisher is bright blue A marble isn’t hard
Matched A summer night is balmy A marble isn’t hard
Visual target sentence example
True Mismatched A light bulb is very hot Rice isn’t black
Matched A giraffe is spotted Rice isn’t black
False Mismatched A light bulb is very hot Rice isn’t white
Matched A giraffe is spotted Rice isn’t white
Critical words are shown here in bold for clarification.
the negation may cause this effect to be delayed. This would
be in line with the delayed embodied effects in negated sen-
tences found by Kaup et al. (2007b). For the false sentences, it
is unclear whether an effect of modality switching will be seen
at all given the previous results (e.g., Hald et al., 2011). Finally,
it may be the case that modality matching might actually aid
the processing of negation, as has been seen with discourse con-
text (e.g., Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008). If that is the case,
then we would expect negated false sentences to elicit greater
N400 amplitudes than negated true sentences when preceded by
a modality matched sentence. For the mismatched condition we
would expect the true negated sentences to elicit a larger N400
amplitude than the false negated sentences, since this pattern of
results is typically found when negated sentences are presented
out of context (in line with Fischler et al., 1983). Overall, by
examining the modality switch effect in combination with veracity
and negation, a richer understanding of the parameters by which
embodied cognition influences language comprehension should
be achievable.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen participants were initially recruited from the Psychology
undergraduate cohort attending Canterbury Christ Church Uni-
versity and took part in the study. Of these three were eliminated
during the filtering of target EEG events due to a large amount of
data loss (i.e., a loss of more than one third of target events). A fur-
ther two participants were excluded from the final analysis because
their EEG recordings exhibited excessive artifacts resulting in the
loss of a large number of trials (i.e., a loss of more than one third
of trials), resulting in a final sample of eleven participants (seven
females; aged 18–32, mean 21.1; four males; aged 18–26, mean
22.5). Participants were awarded course credit for completing the
study and all had normal or corrected to normal vision, were right
handed, native English speakers, and had not been diagnosed with
reading or speaking difficulties.
Ethical approval for the study was granted by Canterbury Christ
Church University’s Faculty Research Ethics Committee and all
participants provided written consent prior to taking part in the
study.
STIMULUS MATERIAL AND DESIGN
Materials comprised 160 pairs of experimental sentences consist-
ing of an initial sentence, referred to as the Modality Context
sentence and a second Target sentence. The Modality Context sen-
tences were always true non-negated statements and were evenly
divided into those that described either a visual (50%) or haptic
property (50%) of an object. The Modality Context sentences were
a subset of items that have been previously rated as more salient
in one modality than others (see Pecher et al., 2003; Van Dantzig
et al., 2008; Lynott and Connell, 2009).
The target sentences were always negated (e.g., Rice isn’t
black/white) and in half of the trials their modality matched
that of the Modality Context sentence, with veracity of the tar-
get sentence equally balanced. Hence, modality-match/-mismatch
and target sentence veracity were fully crossed creating 40
pairs of modality matched true sentences, 40 pairs of modality
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matched false sentences, 40 pairs of modality-mismatched true
sentences, and 40 pairs of modality-mismatched false sen-
tences.
False versions of the negated target sentences were created using
words that were independently rated as the opposite of the salient
modality feature of the object (see Hald et al., 2011). For exam-
ple, in the true negated visual target sentence “Rice isn’t black”
the salient visual feature of “black” was replaced with “white” (see
Table 2 for example stimuli; a full list of negated sentences is
available on request).
To ensure that there was an equal number of affirmative and
negative sentences an additional 160 filler sentences were con-
structed. These comprised 80 affirmative and 80 negative sen-
tences. Half of the filler sentences contained strong modality
related properties, using tactile, visual, auditory, and gustatory
modality related information. The remaining half was not based
on modality specific information but merely contained highly
related words conveying false information (e.g.,“A ball is refereed”;
see Pecher et al., 2003 for similar use of semantically related items).
However, it was not possible to match the number of sentence pairs
that were context negative-target affirmative with those that were
context affirmative-target negative. Such a procedure would have
required an additional extra 80 sentence pairs which would also
have increased the duration of the task and in all likelihood led to a
reduction in participant motivation and engagement levels. Thus,
given that the participant remained unaware of the fact that sen-
tences were presented in pairs it seemed more important to control
for the absolute number of affirmative and negative sentences and
true and false sentences.
The critical words were matched on a number of measures
including: (i) word log (lemma) frequency (true-matched modal-
ity: 2.37; true-mismatched modality: 2.37; false-matched modal-
ity: 2.32; and false-mismatched modality: 2.32, from Baayen et al.,
1993); (ii) word length (true-matched modality: 4.5 letters; true-
mismatched modality: 4.5 letters; false-matched modality: 4.7
letters; and false-mismatched modality: 4.7 letters); and (iii) word
class (all adjectives). In addition, none of the critical words was
over 12 letters in length.
The pairs of sentences were presented in a pseudo-randomized
order specific to each participant (created using Mix; Van Casteren
and Davis, 2006) using a fully within participants design. The use
of a within participants design meant that the findings from this
study could be easily compared to previous similar designs (e.g.,
Fischler et al., 1983; Pecher et al., 2003; Hald et al., 2011).
PROCEDURE FOR THE ERP STUDY
After reading an information sheet, participants completed a short
questionnaire asking about language background, basic health,
and handedness. They then completed a standard consent form
and began the experiment. Each participant was tested individu-
ally in a quiet room, seated in a comfortable chair approximately
70 cm from the computer monitor and were asked not to move or
blink during the presentation of the sentences. Participants were
asked to read each sentence for comprehension and decide whether
it was true or false.
The stimuli were presented using the E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider
et al., 2002) stimuli presentation platform. Each session began with
a practice block of 10 sentences, which were similar in nature to the
experimental items. At the end of the practice block, the partici-
pant had the opportunity to ask questions relating to the task. The
remaining sentences were then split into six blocks, each lasting
for approximately 12 min, with a short break between blocks. Each
block began with two filler items, which were similar in nature to
the experimental items. These filler items were included to min-
imize the potential loss of data due to artifacts resulting from
beginning a task.
Each trial began with a fixation point (“+++”) displayed for
1 s in the center of the screen. Participants were told that they
could blink their eyes during the fixation display if needed, but
to be prepared not to blink during the upcoming sentence. After
a variable time delay (randomly varying across trials from 300
to 450 ms), the sentence was presented word by word in white
lowercase letters (Courier New, 18-point font) against a black
background. The first word and any proper noun were capital-
ized and the final word of each sentence was followed by a full
stop. Words were presented for 200 ms with a stimulus onset asyn-
chrony of 500 ms. Following presentation of the final word in
each sentence the screen remained blank for 1000 ms after which
three question marks appeared, along with the text, “1:true” and
“5:false.” Participants needed to respond by pressing either the
“1” or the “5” on the number keypad of a standard keyboard
to indicate whether they thought the sentence was true or false.
The association between number and veracity was counterbal-
anced so that for all participants, half of the time the number 1
indicated true and half the time the number 5 indicated true. If
participants responded incorrectly the feedback message “Wrong
Answer” was displayed and if they took more than 3000 ms to
respond the feedback message “Too Slow” was displayed. Exactly
the same presentation procedure was used for context and target
sentences so that participants remained unaware that sentences
were presented in pairs. Following the experiment all participants
were debriefed.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
The EEG was recorded using a 64-channel WaveGuard Cap uti-
lizing sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes connected to an ANT amplifier
(ANT, Enschede, Netherlands). An average reference was used. The
electrodes were placed according to the 10–20 standard nomen-
clature (Jasper, 1958) over midline (FPz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz,
and Oz) lateral (Fp1, Fp2, AF3, AF4, AF7, AF8, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5,
F6, F7, and F8), fronto-central (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, and
FC6), central (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, and C6), temporal (FT7, FT8,
T7, T8, TP7, and TP8), centro-parietal (CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5,
and CP6), parietal (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6), and occipital (PO3,
PO4, PO5, PO6, PO7, PO8, O1, and O2) positions. The signals
were digitized online with a sampling frequency of 512 Hz and
bandpass filtered from 0.01 to 100 Hz. Electrode impedance was
maintained below 10 kΩ.
Analysis was conducted using ASA (ANT, Enschede, Nether-
lands) software. EEG data were initially screened for potential
artifacts in a critical window ranging from −100 to 1000 ms
post stimulus onset. Trials containing artifacts were excluded
from further analysis, which resulted in 90.83% of epochs being
included.
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RESULTS
An overview of nine representative electrodes (out of 64 total elec-
trodes) is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the effect of
modality for true sentences. Figure 2 shows the same effect for
false sentences.
Based on established effects from the literature, together with a
visual inspection of the ERP waveforms, we divided the analy-
sis into the following time windows after critical word onset:
190–300 ms to capture the N1–P2 complex, 325–400 ms to cap-
ture a smaller peaked N400 effect, 300–500 ms to encompass the
N400 window, and 600–850 ms for late effects. The results for each
time window are discussed in turn below. Figures 1 and 2 illus-
trate the effect of modality switching for each of these four time
windows.
For each time window, a fully within participants three-way
analysis of Modality switch (match, mismatch), Veracity (true,
false), and Region (anterior, posterior) was conducted. This was
followed by planned comparisons of (i) Modality switch for true
sentences, (ii) Modality switch for false sentences, (iii) Veracity for
matched sentences, and (iv) Veracity for mismatched sentences.
FIRST TIME WINDOW: 190–300MS
This time window was selected to examine the N1–P2 complex.
In the overall 2× 2× 2 analysis, a main effect of Modality switch
was found [F(1, 10)= 5.04, MSE= 0.27, p < 0.05], where different
modality sentences evoked greater positivity than same modality
(0.292 vs. 0.242µV, difference 0.05). A Modality switch by Region
interaction [F(1,10)= 5.19,MSE= 7.79,p < 0.05] was also found,
as well as a Modality switch by Region by Veracity interaction [F(1,
10)= 6.35, MSE= 8.79, p < 0.05].
We investigated both interactions using a simple main effects
analysis. For true sentences alone, a Modality switch effect was
found across frontal electrodes [F(1, 10)= 29.79, MSE= 2.00,
p < 0.001], where a greater positivity was seen for modality mis-
match than match (0.837 vs. 0.180µV, difference 0.657). Staying
with the true sentences, the Modality switch effect was reversed for
the posterior electrodes [F(1, 10)= 25.33, MSE= 1.48, p < 0.01;
−0.244 vs. 0.277µV, difference −0.521; see Figure 3]. For false
sentences, no effect of modality switch was found.
Similarly, for modality matched sentences, no effect of Verac-
ity was found. For modality-mismatched sentences, however, a
marginal effect of Veracity was found for the frontal electrodes
[F(1, 10)= 4.23, MSE= 6.75, p= 0.067], where true sentences
evoked a greater positivity than false (0.837 vs. 0.382µV, difference
−0.455). This effect was reversed in the posterior region (−0.244
vs. 0.192µV, difference 0.436) but failed to reach significance [F(1,
10)= 3.52, MSE= 7.42, p= 0.090].
SECOND TIME WINDOW: 325–400MS
This window was selected to examine early but brief N400-like
effects. The overall analysis for this window showed only inter-
actions of Veracity by Region [F(1, 10)= 7.91, MSE= 17.61,
p < 0.05] and Veracity by Region by Modality switch [F(1,
10)= 9.31, MSE= 19.20, p < 0.05].
These interactions were investigated using simple effects. For
true sentences, we found a marginally significant effect of Modal-
ity switch [F(1, 10)= 4.28, MSE= 20.72, p= 0.065] in the frontal
electrodes, where mismatch showed a greater positivity than match
(0.929 vs. 0.126µV, difference 0.803). This effect was reversed in
the posterior electrodes [F(1, 10)= 5.30, MSE= 10.30, p < 0.05],
FIGURE 1 | Event-related potential traces for true sentences for nine
selected sites across the scalp, time locked to onset of the critical word
(presented at 0ms). Negative activation is plotted up. The red lines show the
True-Mismatched condition, the green line shows the True-Matched condition.
The limits of each of the four time windows for analysis are indicated
(1=190–300 ms; 2=325–400 ms; 3=300–500 ms; 4=600–850).
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FIGURE 2 | Event-related potential traces for false sentences for nine
selected sites across the scalp, time locked to onset of the critical word
(presented at 0ms). Negative activation is plotted up. The blue lines show
the False-Mismatched condition, the black line shows the False-Matched
condition. The limits of each of the four time windows for analysis are
indicated (1=190–300 ms; 2=325–400 ms; 3=300–500 ms; 4=600–850).
FIGURE 3 | Event-related potential in microvolts across the scalp at 238ms post onset of the critical word, approximately at the peak of the
difference. Blue hues indicate negative potentials, red hues positive potentials. The two conditions shown are True-Mismatch (A) and True-Match (B).
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where greater negativity appeared for the modality-mismatched
sentences (−0.590 vs. 0.040µV, difference −0.63; see Figure 5
below). For false sentences, no effect of Modality switch was found
across the frontal electrodes, but was found for the posterior
electrodes [F(1, 10)= 5.20, MSE= 5.51, p < 0.05], where greater
positivity was associated with mismatch compared to match (0.465
vs. 0.009µV, difference 0.456). See Figure 4 for a topographic
illustration of this effect.
We investigated Veracity for matched sentences and found no
effect in either the frontal or posterior regions. However, for mis-
matched sentences, we found a frontal effect for Veracity [F(1,
10)= 24.71, MSE= 6.62, p < 0.01], where false sentences elicited
a greater negativity than true (−0.162 vs. 0.929µV, difference
−1.091), as well as a reversed posterior effect [F(1, 10)= 36.00,
MSE= 4.26, p < 0.001], where greater negativity was associated
with true sentences vs. false (0.465 vs. −0.590µV, difference
1.055). This is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 below.
THIRD TIME WINDOW: 300–500MS
We chose this time window to examine N400-like effects. The over-
all analysis found a main effect of Modality switch [F(1, 10)= 5.59,
MSE= 0.37, p < 0.05], where overall matched sentences showed
greater negativity than mismatched (0.100 vs. 0.161µV, difference
0.061), as well as a Veracity by Region interaction [F(1, 10)= 7.78,
MSE= 24.12, p < 0.05] and a Veracity by Region by Modality
switch interaction [F(1, 10)= 8.54, MSE= 16.41, p < 0.05].
Using simple main effects, we examined Modality switch in
the frontal region for true sentences, finding a main effect [F(1,
10)= 6.67, MSE= 12.64, p < 0.05], where mismatch showed the
greater positivity (0.857 vs. 0.074µV,difference 0.783; see Figure 5.
This effect was reversed for the posterior region [F(1, 10)= 8.63,
MSE= 6.35, p < 0.05], where greater negativity was associated
with mismatched sentences (−0.509 vs. 0.122µV, difference
−0.631). For false sentences, there was no effect of Modality switch
in either the frontal or posterior regions.
There was no effect of Veracity for modality matched sentences
in the frontal or posterior regions. However, for mismatched sen-
tences, we found a marked positivity for true sentences in the
frontal region [F(1, 10)= 25.24, MSE= 6.77, p < 0.05; 0.857µV
vs.−0.258, difference−1.115]. For the posterior region, this effect
was reversed [F(1, 10)= 30.05, MSE= 5.18, p < 0.001; 0.555µV
vs.−0.509, difference 1.064]. Figure 6 illustrates this veracity effect
at site CPz and Figure 7 illustrates a topographical plot of the
veracity effect.
FOURTH TIME WINDOW: 600–850MS
This time window was chosen to examine late positive effects. In
the overall analysis, we found interactions of Veracity by Modal-
ity switch [F(1, 10)= 3.71, MSE= 0.64, p < 0.05], and Veracity
by Modality switch by Region [F(1, 10)= 7.06, MSE= 30.12,
p < 0.05]. See Figures 1 and 2 for a plot of representative elec-
trodes within this time window and Figure 8 for topographical
plot of this effect.
Simple main effects were used to examine the effect of Modal-
ity switch in the frontal region for true sentences. We found a
marginally significant effect of Modality switch [F(1, 10)= 4.59,
MSE= 20.98, p= 0.058], where matched sentences showed a
greater negativity than mismatched (−0.883 vs. −0.046µV,
difference 0.837). In the posterior region, the direction of this rela-
tionship was reversed but did not reach significance (p= 0.08). We
FIGURE 4 | Event-related potential in microvolts across the scalp at 377ms post onset of the critical word, approximately at the peak of the
difference. Blue hues indicate negative potentials, red hues positive potentials. The two conditions shown are False-Mismatch (C) and False-Match (D).
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FIGURE 5 | Event-related potential in microvolts across the scalp at 364ms post onset of the critical word, approximately at the peak of the
difference. Blue hues indicate negative potentials, red hues positive potentials. The two conditions shown are True-Mismatch (A) and True-Match (B).
FIGURE 6 | Event-related potential traces on CPz comparing
veracity for matching and mismatching modalities, time locked
to onset of the critical word (presented at 0ms). Negative
activation is plotted up. The left side shows true (red) and false (blue)
sentences in the mismatch condition. The right side shows true
(green) and false (black) sentences in the match condition. The limits
of the two time windows of interest are indicated (2=325–400 ms;
3=300–500 ms).
repeated these analyses for false sentences and found a significant
effect of Modality switch in the frontal region [F(1, 10)= 5.27,
MSE= 8.50, p < 0.05], where a greater negativity was seen for
mismatched sentences (−0.752 vs.−0.181µV, difference−0.571).
For the posterior region, this effect was reversed but did not reach
significance (p= 0.072).
We next examined the effect of Veracity in the frontal region
for modality matched sentences but found no reliable differ-
ences. Similarly, we found no reliable veracity differences in
modality-mismatched sentences for either region.
REACTION TIME DATA
Participants made a true/false judgment after each sentence was
presented. We include an analysis of the reaction time data here
for completeness. However, since the reaction time data of Pecher
et al. (2003) included three times the number of participants
per condition than we have used here, we do not necessarily
expect to have enough power to detect all differences. Addi-
tionally, in order to minimize movement artifacts during the
critical word, participants were not required to give a speeded
response (see Procedure for the ERP Study for details). All data
were trimmed using a non-recursive criterion of 2.5 SD from
the mean, which resulted in a loss of 2.5% (40/1600) of trials.
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3. A mixed
effects regression model was used to take into account the effects
of both participants and items on response times (modeled as
random intercept effects, cf., Janssen, 2012). For this analysis,
we included all correct responses to target sentences. The fixed
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FIGURE 7 | Event-related potential in microvolts across the scalp at
397ms post onset of the critical word, approximately at the peak of
the difference in the mismatch conditions. Blue hues indicate
negative potentials, red hues positive potentials. The conditions shown
are True-Match (B), False-Match (D), True-Mismatch (A), and
False-Mismatch (C).
effect of Modality showed a trend [F(1, 1318)= 2.78, p= 0.096]
whereby slower response times were seen in the Matched com-
pared to Mismatched condition (739.6 and 716.6 ms; d = 0.033).
There was no fixed effect of Veracity [F(1, 1322)= 2.42, p= 0.120]
or Modality×Veracity [F(1, 1323)= 0.92, p= 0.337] interac-
tion. The random intercept effect of Participants was signifi-
cant (Z = 2.09, p < 0.05) and there was similar trend for Items
(Z = 1.65, p= 0.098). These random intercepts are to be expected,
are of no direct theoretical relevance and hence are not dis-
cussed. Accuracy was consistently high across all conditions:
True-Match 83.5% accurate; True-Mismatch 85.25% accurate;
False-Match 86.25% accurate; and False-Mismatch 85.75% accu-
rate. A mixed ANOVA revealed no main effects of Modality
[F(1, 9)= 0.12, p= 0.74], Veracity [F(1, 9)= 0.46, p= 0.52],
or interaction between Modality and Veracity [F(1, 9)= 0.56,
p= 0.47].
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FIGURE 8 | Event-related potential in microvolts across the scalp at
661ms post onset of the critical word, approximately at the peak of
the difference in the mismatch conditions. Blue hues indicate
negative potentials, red hues positive potentials. The conditions shown
are True-Mismatch (A)True-Match (B), False-Mismatch (C), and
False-Match (D).
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study is to explore the modulation of
the modality switch N400 effect. Specifically we hope to under-
stand whether this effect is sensitive to linguistic and semantic
markers. To realize this goal, we have added the factors negation
and veracity to a typical modality switch paradigm, but in this
case while simultaneously recording ERPs. We hoped to shed light
on two questions. First, do sentences containing negation show a
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Table 3 | Average reaction time (ms) and standard deviation for the
true/false judgments on target sentences.
Modality switch True False
Matched 742 (119) 737 (96)
Mismatched 737 (121) 696 (117)
modality switch effect? Finding such an effect would suggest that
sentences containing negation are grounded in perceptual systems.
Secondly, previous studies on negation indicate that context can
affect the processing of negation. Specifically, when negation is
used within a supporting context, processing costs of using nega-
tion are minimal. Can matching modality information similarly
change the processing of negation? In short, our results indicate
that the answer to both of these questions is “yes.” Sentences con-
taining negation do show a modality switch effect similar to that
seen with affirmative sentences. Additionally, the effect of veracity
suggests that matching modality information can affect the pro-
cessing of negation. Specifically, we see a different N400 pattern
for veracity when modality matches, but a standard N400 pattern
to veracity when modality mismatches. The details of these effects
are discussed below in turn. Finally, in the Section “Conclusion,”
we speculate what the current results may mean in terms of the
role of embodied simulation in language comprehension more
generally.
MODALITY SWITCH EFFECT FOR TRUE SENTENCES
The modality switching results of the negated true sentences paral-
lel previous results found with affirmative sentences (e.g., Collins
et al., 2011; Hald et al., 2011). An effect of switching modalities
was found in all four of the time windows. Specifically, as early as
190 ms after the onset of the critical word (Time window 1), true-
mismatched modality sentences led to a greater negativity across
the posterior electrodes compared to true-matched modality sen-
tences. This greater negativity for the true-mismatched modality
sentences continued across the posterior electrodes, resulting in
significant differences in the time windows 300–500 ms (as well as
325–400 ms) and again from 600 to 850 ms. Additionally, across
the frontal-central electrodes, it was the true-matched modality
sentences that showed greater negativity rather than the true-
mismatch modality sentences. This same overall ERP pattern was
seen with the true-mismatch vs. true-match sentences in the com-
parable affirmative experiment (Hald et al., 2011). Likewise, as in
Hald et al. (2011), no significant effect of modality was seen in the
reaction times for true sentences.
This modality switch effect has been previously explained in
terms of the idea that our conceptual system is grounded in
modality specific or embodied simulations (Pecher et al., 2003;
Hald et al., 2011; see below for more details); the current finding
extends the role of embodied simulations to the immediate pro-
cessing involved in negated sentences. This is interesting for at least
three reasons. First, although some previous behavioral evidence
suggests that negation is represented in an embodied fashion,
via a simulation that notes the absence of negated information
(e.g., Kaup and Zwaan, 2003), none of the previous studies have
addressed the role of perceptual modalities on negation processing
as the sentence unfolds online. Our results indicate that the role
of embodied simulation on negation processing can be immediate
and online, rather than a delayed process.
Secondly, the embodied account of negation and false sen-
tences as described by Barsalou (1999) would predict similar ERP
modulations for the modality switching for both false and nega-
tive sentences. That prediction is not supported here. If negated
sentences showed a similar pattern to false sentences, one might
expect that the effect of modality switching on negated true sen-
tences would be very different than what was found for modality
switching in affirmative true sentences. We do not find that here.
Instead it appears that modality switching effects are quite similar
regardless of whether the sentences are affirmative or negative.
Lastly, the current study provides an additional demonstration
of an N400-like effect being sensitive to modality switching. Pos-
sibly the amplitude of the ERP in this case serves as an indicator
of the ease or difficulty of retrieving stored conceptual knowledge
related to a word. This modulation may depend on both the stored
conceptual representation as well as the previous contextual infor-
mation (see Kutas et al., 2006). For example, when a visual context
is followed by the target sentence “Rice isn’t . . .,” participants are
likely to form expectations that may be biased by the visual context
which leads to a simulation which is biased to new visual infor-
mation. When the sentence continues with a “visual” word, the
word is immediately integrated in the simulation. However, when
a tactile word is displayed the modality of the simulation has to be
changed which leads to the modality switch effect and the observed
negativity in the ERP. Before discussing alternative explanations of
the modality switching effect in true sentences, a short discussion
of our modality switching results with false sentences is necessary.
MODALITY SWITCH EFFECT FOR FALSE SENTENCES
In the current study we have seen a small but significant effect
of modality switching for false-mismatched modality sentences
compared to false-matched modality sentences in the posterior
electrodes in the time window 325–400 ms after critical word onset
(Time window 2). Interestingly, the effect of modality switching
for the false sentences is opposite to that seen here for true sen-
tences. False sentences led to a greater N400-like effect for the
match modality condition compared to the mismatch condition.
With the true sentences the mismatch led to a greater N400-like
effect compared to the match condition. This finding is differ-
ent than what was previously seen with false affirmative sentences
(Hald et al., 2011), where no significant effect of modality switch-
ing was found. However, it should be noted that the pattern of
results for the false sentences in the Hald et al. (2011) study mir-
rors that seen here; it is simply that the effect was not sufficiently
robust to reach significance.
Why the effect for false sentences is significant in one study
but not in the other cannot yet be fully explained and as such
is worth exploring further in future research. However, since the
significant effect for false sentences is quite small (a 0.46 ampli-
tude difference) as well as occurring only in a short time window
(325–400 ms), it seems likely that the modality switch effect may
be more difficult to find when using false sentences. Previously,
we discussed the possibility that the null effect with false sen-
tences may be due to a simulation of the sentence failing (see Hald
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et al., 2011). Specifically, we assumed that participants compared
the information from the simulation of the false sentence to
background knowledge they have, and when the simulation did
not match background knowledge, the simulation failed (also, see
Barsalou, 1999, for a discussion of simulations failing with false
sentences). However, it was felt at the time that this was not an
entirely adequate explanation of falsity, since it seems that making
the simulation of the false sentence itself would still show some
benefit of a modality match. We felt a more reasonable explana-
tion was that when participants tried to simulate“the cellar is light ”
(an affirmative false sentence example from Hald et al., 2011) out
of context they were unable to immediately activate the relevant
perceptual/action/emotion information due to limited experience
with the information in the sentences. Essentially we claimed that
such simulations take longer out of context, and the modality
switch effect being a small and subtle effect, is not observed in
this case. However, in the current study with false sentences, we
did observe such a modality switch effect. This may be due to
the negation itself changing the type of perceptual information
that is included in the sentences that needs to be simulated. With
negated sentences, the individual lexical items that make up the
sentences are concepts that we have had extensive experience of
being paired together. To illustrate this take the “Rice isn’t white”
example. Rice typically is white. Given this, it may be the case that
it is this relationship between the two concepts that allows partic-
ipants to more quickly simulate the false sentence, which leads to
the small, but significant effect of modality switching. The differ-
ence in the direction of the effect with regard to false sentences
(false-match sentences leading to greater negativity compared to
false-mismatch sentences as opposed to true-mismatch sentences
leading to greater negativity compared to true-match sentences)
may simply be an indication of the falseness of the sentence, but
at this point further research is needed to better understand why
false sentences lead to the opposite effect in the ERPs compared to
true sentences.
Overall, the results indicate an effect of modality switching on
the ERPs regardless of whether the sentences are true or false,
but the specific effect differs depending upon veracity (true sen-
tences leading to a larger N400 for mismatch compared to match
pairs; false sentences leading to a larger N400 for match compared
to mismatch pairs). Essentially it seems that when the reader is
in the visual modality, they can easily predict/expect from “Rice
isn’t. . .” anything that is in the visual modality except “white.”
“White” is particularly unexpected in this context and therefore
produces a larger N400. ERP results for modality switching with
affirmative sentences are somewhat similar to ERP modulations
that have been found for pictures and combined sentence-picture
stimuli (Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Ganis et al., 1996). Essentially,
we again found a very similar effect. This suggests that negative
sentences, like affirmative sentences that refer to a highly salient
physical aspect of an object induce ERP effects that are compara-
ble to those effects that have been obtained with pictures (see Hald
et al., 2011, for a more detailed discussion of the parallel between
results obtained with pictures and those obtained with sentences).
Overall, interpreting these results within an embodied cognition
framework would suggest that our participants generated a men-
tal simulation of the properties of the object (Rice isn’t black),
which produced activation that is very similar to actually seeing
the object. An intriguing direction for future research would be
to determine whether the visual sentences show this effect more
robustly than the tactile sentences, as might be predicted by this
explanation. Furthermore, by examining other modalities as well
as possible actions and emotions we may be able to find specific
ERP signatures that are related to the particular modality/action or
emotion being simulated. Some suggestion that this may indeed
occur comes from Collins et al. (2011), where differential ERP
effects were seen for modality switching for visual vs. auditory
properties.
VERACITY RESULTS FOR MODALITY MISMATCH
With affirmative sentences a larger N400 is typically seen for false
sentences compared to true sentences (e.g., Hagoort et al., 2004).
However, for negative sentences without a context, the pattern
of results typically reverses (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983). True sen-
tences lead to a larger N400 compared to false sentences. This
suggests that as far as the N400 is immediately sensitive to inte-
grating words into the higher-order representation, people appear
to be at first only considering something like rice + black when
trying to comprehend single sentences containing negation (as
in the “two-step” theories of negation discussed in the introduc-
tion). In line with this idea, we found that the true-mismatched
negated sentences elicited a larger N400 amplitude than the false-
mismatched negated sentences in Time windows 2 and 3. No
differences were seen across the other two time windows. Similarly,
in the reaction times we saw that overall (collapsing across modal-
ity match/mismatch) false sentences were responded to faster than
true sentences. No interaction was seen with modality, an issue
that will be discussed below.
It has been suggested that for negation to be processed imme-
diately, like affirmative sentences, a context of plausible denial is
necessary (Wason, 1965). A context of plausible denial is when
one negates something that may have been mistakenly believed
(e.g., “The nurse was not a woman”). In the current study, for
the modality-mismatched sentences there was no context to aid
the processing of negation, and therefore it is not surprising we
obtained results compatible with negation not being immediately
processed. As outlined above, when the critical word“black”comes
in, the modality of the situation needs to change and this causes a
delay. By the time of the N400 window, the modality of the simu-
lation may have switched to visual, but given the negation without
context, the simulation is essentially based on “rice” and “black” at
this stage and therefore a standard N400 for negated sentences is
observed.
VERACITY RESULTS FOR MODALITY MATCH
Independent of the explanation of the modality switching effect,
our results for matching modality with negated sentences are inter-
esting for another reason. As discussed in the introduction, studies
have typically shown that when negated sentences are presented
without a discourse context, it is the true sentences that elicit a
greater N400 than the false sentences. For our modality match-
ing sentences, this typical finding disappears. Instead we see no
difference between the true and false sentences when the modality
matches, in any of the four time windows. This is the same pattern
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as we found with the affirmative sentences (Hald et al., 2011),
where no effect of veracity was seen when the modality matched.
Why might such a robust effect as veracity disappear when the
modalities match? We offer the following tentative hypothesis. In
the matched modality case, after a simulation that highlights, for
example, visual features (A giraffe is spotted), simulating Rice isn’t
white/black benefits from also being in the visual modality. As
discussed in the introduction, it is often assumed that in order
to determine truth value of negative sentences, people have to
first suppose an “inner proposition,” in this case something like
“Rice is white/black.” We would suggest that rather than a propo-
sition per se, our results suggest that if an early representation like
this occurs, then it is more likely to be an embodied simulation
than a proposition. Therefore the modality match allows for a
richer simulation to arise more quickly, potentially making both
true and false sentences equally easy to process. We propose that
this is likely the reason why no N400 difference is seen for the
true negated condition compared to the false negated condition,
similar to what was seen for affirmative sentences. In combina-
tion with the results on affirmative sentences, we propose that
matching modality allows for a quicker and broader simulation
of relevant properties of the sentence, including support for less
likely properties of the sentence. Hence making even a typically
false property of an object easier to process (see Hald et al., 2011
for a more detailed explanation of how this works with affirmative
sentences).
However, facilitating a simulation in itself does not remove
the difficulty of processing negation. If that were the case, the
false negated sentences should have elicited a larger amplitude
N400 than the true negated sentences. Instead we see no difference
between the true and false negated sentences. This is also what we
found with affirmative sentences (Hald et al., 2011). It seems likely
that our results with modality matching facilitates early processes
related to veracity judgment and possibly prior to negation being
fully taken into account and before the final veracity judgment has
been decided. In other words, it seems that the modality match
allows for a simulation that is more “accepting” of a wider variety
of possible properties of an object, including the less typical ones.
However, this is just speculation at this point and clearly needs to
be followed up.
The reaction time pattern corresponds to this ERP pattern. The
reaction time difference between true and false sentences appears
much smaller in the modality matching condition than in the
mismatch condition. However, whilst a trend in response times
between modality was observed this was not robust and given
the lack of any interaction between modality and veracity we can
only speculate that with more participants this pattern may more
closely match the pattern seen in the ERPs. As noted in the Results
section, we were not expecting a significant effect of modality in
the reaction times.
Overall, these results suggest that modality matching modulates
the veracity-related N400. This may be similar to how discourse
context can modulate the effect of veracity (see Hald et al., 2007).
How important modality information is for negation processing
is still not fully understood, but it may be the case that modality
matching information can act as a form of context, like plausible
denial, which allows for more immediate processing of negation.
Essentially, if readers expect to stay within a modality, that limits
what can be said and hence what might be negated.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR MODALITY MATCH EFFECTS
Although our results fit well with the idea that readers are creat-
ing an embodied simulation grounded in the perceptual systems,
whereby a mismatch in perceptual information in the sentences
leads to a greater processing load, there are alternative explana-
tions for this finding. One alternative explanation of modality
switching is based on the organization of the linguistic semantic
system. It could be the case that the linguistic semantic system
is organized in such a way that is sensitive to modality informa-
tion, but is still symbolic. This would mean that this effect is not
due to activation in modality specific regions in the brain, but
instead is due to a type of semantic priming. That is, semantic
priming based on modalities rather than semantic association. In
the original study by Pecher et al. (2003) the authors attempted
to rule out this possibility by conducting a control study where
they looked for modality switching type costs with sentences that
matched/mismatched in semantic associations (based on Nelson
et al., 1999 norms). For example, they looked at sentence pairs
like “Sheet can be spotless – Air can be clean.” compared to “Sheet
can be spotless – Meal can be cheap.” Here “spotless” and “clean”
are highly associated semantically where “spotless” and “cheap” are
not. However they found no priming effect or any effect on errors
for “clean” compared to “cheap.” There was no cost to switch-
ing between sentences that matched or mismatched semantically.
This is not too surprising since it has long been known that lexi-
cal semantic priming effects are typically very short lived and are
not sustained past 1–2 intervening words (e.g., Zwitserlood et al.,
2000). Nonetheless, the results of the priming control study fur-
ther supported the idea that the modality switch costs were due to
modality specific information predicted by an embodied model of
cognition, rather than priming of symbolic symbols organized by
modality (see also Van Dantzig et al., 2008; Oosterwijk et al., 2012;
for additional results suggesting that the modality switch effect is
not due to semantic priming alone).
However, a recent study by Louwerse and Connell (2011) sug-
gests that instead of relying on an embodied cognition account
alone to describe this type of data, they propose that a symbolic
and an embodied cognition account can be complementary. They
used statistical information about word co-occurrences to predict
response times in a modality switch paradigm where participants
verified whether properties shared or shifted modalities. Overall,
they suggest that two factors contribute to the modality switch
effect, semantic priming for modality information (the linguis-
tic word co-occurrence information) and secondarily embodied
semantic information. Although our study is not designed to tease
apart these differences, what is striking about both the current
study as well as the results from Hald et al. (2011) is that the
two modalities used (visual and tactile) would not be predicted
to show any linguistic priming effects according to Louwerse and
Connell (2011). Within their model, they found that the linguis-
tic account did not make such fine-grained distinctions between
all of the five modalities. Important for the current paper, visual,
and tactile modalities were not distinguished within their linguis-
tic model. Accordingly, this would mean that any modality switch
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effects found here or in Hald et al. (2011) cannot be due to priming
of symbols organized by modality, at least if there is no distinction
made between visual and haptic modalities. The model proposed
by Louwerse and Connell (2011) does not exhaust the possibili-
ties of statistical effects. It is well possible that there are statistical
effects they have not picked up that could still be influencing
our results. This same basic argument, that linguistic word co-
occurrence factors alone cannot account for modality switching
effects, was also offered by Connell and Lynott (2011) to account
for modality switching costs seen with novel concepts (e.g., jin-
gling onion). At present we can only speculate about the influence
of statistical word co-occurrence on our results. We believe that
there may well be an influence of statistical word co-occurrence
information in tandem with an embodied approach, leading to
the current results. However, the Louwerse and Connell (2011)
approach to linguistic context may not capture statistical pat-
terns at an appropriate level of granularity (contextual frame).
The authors define linguistic context as the frequency of first-
order co-occurrences of modality specific words (p. 384), which
may be insensitive to patterns at other levels. A more sensitive
model of word co-occurrences may demonstrate that both statis-
tical properties as well as an embodied approach contribute to our
findings with visual and haptic modalities. The difficult task will
be to determine under what circumstances statistical information
and embodied information/processing differ. For example, one
may imagine a situation where word co-occurrence is very low,
just because we do not talk about that property of an object often.
Nonetheless, in these circumstances, a modality switch effect is still
seen due to the embodied simulation. This may be exactly what
occurs with novel combinations (e.g., jingling onion; Connell and
Lynott, 2011). Here there is no word co-occurrence information
to rely upon, but a simulation allows us to easily come up with
an interpretation of this combination (e.g., An onion that makes
a jingling sound when you move it). Maybe the main purpose
of the embodied simulation is to support novel combinations,
but this is clearly speculative [see Lynott and Connell, 2010 for a
review of models of conceptual combinations, including one that
utilizes embodied conceptual combination (ECCo)]. There may
be many empirical ways of teasing apart embodied and linguistic
co-occurrence accounts, and there is already a growing body of evi-
dence suggesting that information like type of stimuli (Louwerse
and Jeuniaux, 2010), the particular cognitive task at hand (Louw-
erse and Jeuniaux, 2010), and the time of processing (Louwerse
and Connell, 2011; Louwerse and Hutchinson, 2012) all appear
to influence the interaction between statistical information and
embodied information.
At this stage there is no evidence for a symbolic system with the
complexity needed to account for our results, but we cannot rule
out the possibility that evidence for such a system will be found in
the future. Our motivation in beginning this project was to bet-
ter understand the time course of embodied representations with
negative true and false sentences rather than understanding the
precise nature of how these seemingly embodied representations
come about. Furthermore, we feel that a purely statistical account
of the type proposed by Louwerse and Connell (2011) is unlikely
to accommodate our results. Secondly, by using sentences that
matched on modality but varied on veracity, a simple associative
priming explanation would predict the same (or similar) find-
ings for both the true and false sentences when they mismatch on
veracity. This is not what we found here or in the affirmative study
(Hald et al., 2011). Nonetheless, several follow-up studies are cur-
rently being conducted to more satisfactorily address whether an
associative priming explanation can better account for the data
than an embodied framework.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our results fit well with idea that during comprehension
we construct embodied simulations that are based on the previous
discourse information in order to integrate the incoming infor-
mation with the current simulation (see Glenberg and Robertson,
1999; Zwaan and Madden, 2005; for detailed accounts of how
these simulations arise). Specifically our results suggest that the
construction of a simulation in one modality for the context sen-
tence can aid the simulation of the target sentence if it is in the
same modality. This indicates that the simulation process, which
is central to embodied language processing, can be predictive (in
line with Barsalou, 2009), and that a stronger prediction can be
made when there is no modality switch. We find that it is impor-
tant to illustrate that judging veracity and understanding negation
(linguistic and semantic markers) both seem to be influenced by
embodied simulations during language comprehension. However,
this is only half of the story. Leaving the conclusion at that is not
satisfying; there are already many studies supporting the general
idea that embodied simulations underlie language comprehen-
sion. We believe that by adding veracity and negation to the list
of factors that seem to be influenced by embodied simulations
allows us add something new to the larger puzzle of how embodied
simulation supports language processing. Specifically, we propose
several parameters regarding how embodied simulations support
language comprehension in relationship to veracity and negation.
First, our very early effects of modality switching (beginning as
early as 190 ms) suggest that the timing of embodied representa-
tions can be very fast. This is important because it suggests that
the perceptual systems are involved in more than just a late deep-
postlexical aspect of semantic processing. Aside from the timing
of the effect, we believe that the modality switch effect related to
veracity is due to an automatic, yet context driven simulation that
is made by meshing the affordances of (i.e., Gibson, 1979) and
world knowledge about the objects and actions included in the
sentence (and wider discourse when available). Rather than per-
forming some sort of comparison process between the simulation
and the situation at hand (as Barsalou, 1999 proposes), instead we
propose that the veracity judgment comes out of the process of
building the simulation. When you have a false sentence, a slow
down2 in the simulation occurs, since the process of meshing the
affordances is more difficult due to having less experience with
the relevant objects and actions in combination in the real world.
In terms of our results, this “slow down” is evidenced by a much
smaller modality switch effect. This same slow down occurs when
2When we use the term “slow-down” or slowed simulation here, what we mean is
that reaching a final simulation may be slower, however it may be more accurate to
describe this as more difficult. Additional research is needed to better determine the
best way to characterize this type of simulation.
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you receive novel compounds (e.g., Connell and Lynott, 2011); that
is, they find smaller switching costs with novel compounds. How-
ever, one’s ability to consciously determine whether to interpret a
slowed simulation as due to falseness or simply due to a new con-
cept that we have little experience with depends on the context. In
the context of the current experiment (judging sentences to be true
or false), you will reach a “false” judgment from that slowed down
simulation. On the other hand,when the context is to come up with
a valid interpretation of a novel compound (such as, jingling onion
in Connell and Lynott, 2011), you will not interpret a “slowed”
simulation as an indication of falseness, but instead as a new con-
cept. As discussed, it is possible that the modality match allows for
a simulation that is more “accepting” of a wider variety of possible
properties of an object, including less typical ones, but this process
is more difficult. We do not have the space here to expand on all of
the predictions this would make, but for example this would sug-
gest that if we tested novel compounds with ERPs, we should find
a similar modulation of the ERP for novel compounds as we see
here for false sentences: namely, a much smaller effect of modality
switching. Furthermore, this “slower” simulation may be the locus
of the opposite amplitude switch effect seen in the false sentences,
but further research is needed to confirm whether this is the case
or not. Lastly, in relationship to negated sentences, we believe that
understanding negation depends on the same simulation process
described above for veracity. However, unlike veracity, the correct
interpretation of negation needs a different type of contextual sup-
port and it does not always fall out of the particular context/task
demands in the same way that it may do for judging veracity vs.
understanding novel compounds. Instead there may be a need for
a second process of negating information that is already simu-
lated (as proposed by Kaup et al., 2007a) when there is not much
contextual support. However, when there is supporting discourse
context and/or supporting world knowledge or in our case, modal-
ity matching, the simulation may be able to immediately negate the
relevant information while building the simulation (in line with
Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008). We believe the lack of verac-
ity effects on our negated modality matched sentences may be an
indication of the initial steps in this simulation process that could
lead to immediate negation during the simulation.
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